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ARTICLESI
Sources of Injustice in Death Penalty
Practice: The Pennsylvania Experience
Bruce Ledewitz*
I. Introduction
What is the point of an opponent of the death penalty, like my-
self, discussing the injustice of certain death sentences? The oppo-
nent of the death penalty, after all, opposes the death penalty in all
cases, whether "just" or "unjust." In that regard, the opponent does
not commit himself in a candid way to assist in understanding when
the death penalty might be a just outcome and when, instead, the
death penalty might be thought unjust.
Obviously, the point of this undertaking is not to point out how
the death penalty could be improved by imposing it only when just.
It is my hope to illuminate aspects of the death penalty system that
undermine confidence in its reliability. For those who insist that reli-
ability is a meaningful and crucial requirement, this survey may
weaken confidence that just outcomes in death penalty cases are rou-
tine. I will attempt to suggest in this article that, because of the
enormity of effort that would be required, fundamental improve-
ments to Pennsylvania's death penalty system are not likely to occur.
It is also my belief, though I will not defend that view here, that
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. The author serves as the Di-
rector of the Allegheny County Death Penalty Project.
This article is dedicated to Professor Charles Black, who has taught generations of his
students to look at the death penalty in practice and not just in theory.
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careful analysis of the experiences in other American jurisdictions
would yield overall patterns very similar to those in Pennsylvania.
II. The Proponent's Definition of Injustice in the Imposition of a
Sentence of Death: Who Deserves to Die?
Proponents of the death penalty usually argue from the view-
point that the only "injustice" that could occur in a death penalty
case is that someone "innocent" might be condemned and executed.'
But such a limited definition of injustice is defensible only if one
believes that there is a certain act for which the death penalty is
always a just punishment. If one believes instead that the justice of
the death penalty depends upon a myriad of factors, then even if the
condemned prisoner committed a certain act, his execution might be
unjust.
No proponent of the death penalty takes the position that any
act, including the taking of human life, invariably renders the death
penalty just. Obviously, soldiers and executioners kill and yet no pro-
ponent of the death penalty believes that they deserve the death
penalty.
Nor do most proponents of the death penalty believe that kill-
ings defined by law as wrongful will always merit death. Few pro-
pose, for example, the death penalty for drunk driving that causes
death,2 or for crimes such as manslaughter.
Indeed, for some proponents of the death penalty, killing itself is
not necessarily required to merit the death penalty. Dr. Ernest van
den Haag, for example, favors the death penalty for treason' and
views it as a just punishment for rape." If not for Coker v. Georgia,5
some legislatures no doubt would reenact the death penalty as a
sanction for rape. Thus, despite the rhetoric of proponents of the
death penalty that the murderer should not survive his victim,6 pro-
1. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 219 (1978) [hereinafter PUNISHING
CRIMINALS]. "Injustice justifies abolition only if the losses to justice outweigh the gains-if
more innocents are lost than saved by imposing the penalty compared to whatever net result
alternatives (such as no punishment or life imprisonment) would produce." In these remarks I
will often cite Dr. van den Haag as representative of the proponent side of the death penalty
debate.
2. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE, 131-32 (1983) [hereinafter
DEBATE].
3. Id. at 297.
4. Dr. van den Haag concedes that here the death penalty would not be prudent because
of the incentive the rapist would then have to kill his victim. Id. at 203.
5. 433 U.S. 584 (1971) (death penalty disproportionate for rape of adult woman).
6. Dr van den Haag argues:
Proponents of the death penalty believe that the way . . . to express the vehe-
mence of the social disapproval of murder, to defend innocent life, is to take the
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ponents do not feel that all killers should be executed nor that only
killers should be executed.7
Just as the justice of the death penalty does not depend on the
act alone, it also does not depend solely on mental state. Thus, for
example, even within the category of killing, the "intent to kill" fre-
quently mentioned by proponents of the death penalty8 is clearly
neither sufficient nor necessary to justify the death penalty. Intent to
kill is not sufficient because such intent is often present in lawful
killing-for example, police shootings of fleeing felons, soldiers in
war, and executioners. Intent to kill has been held by the United
States Supreme Court not to be a necessary element for lawful im-
position of the death penalty, as long as murder occurs." No doubt
many proponents of the death penalty agree with the Court's
position.
In the absence of a certain act or a specified mental state, who
is the appropriate-the just-recipient of the death penalty? In dif-
ferent ways, proponents of the death penalty usually rely on the con-
cept of "evil," or some similar idea, in order to identify those persons
who should be executed. Thus, Dr. van den Haag emphasizes the
willingness of proponents of the death penalty to recognize evil in
criminals as a major distinction between those who would abolish the
death penalty and those who would not.
Can we sit in judgment and find that anyone is so irredeemably
wicked that he does not deserve to live? Many of us no longer
believe in evil, only in error or accident. How can one execute a
murderer if one believes that he became one only by error or
accident and is not to blame? Yet if life is to be valued and
secured, it must be known that anyone who takes the life of an-
other forfeits his own.
10
life of those who take innocent life, to unequivocally threaten the death penalty,
and to unflinchingly carry out the threat against anyone who murders anyone
else.
DEBATE, supra note 3, at 275. Dr. van den Haag utilizes this rhetoric repeatedly, though his
acceptance of the justice of the death penalty for nonhomicides undermines this line of
argument.
7. Nor is the justice of the death penalty a matter of taking "innocent" life. Regrettably,
soldiers often kill civilians.
8. See DEBATE, supra note 3, at 102.
9. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (death may be imposed upon defendant who
substantially participated in a felony that resulted in murder and acted with reckless indiffer-
ence to the value of human life). The mental state that is necessary to uphold the death pen-
alty is, basically, common law malice.
10. PUNISHING CRIMINALS, supra note 1, at 213, See also id. at 212: The condemned is
viewed by society "as too loathsome, as unfit to live .... See also DEBATE, supra note 3, at
274 (contrasting the abolitionist position): "[E]ven if anyone could be evil enough to deserve
death in the eyes of heaven, no court, no government would be competent to decide that he
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The judgment that some people are too evil to live helps clarify
why it is difficult for proponents to state in a definitive way who
deserves to die and who does not. For the death penalty proponent,
sometimes the act itself will be sufficient to show the defendant is too
evil to live: the torture/murder of a child, or a dispassionate, planned
killing for insurance proceeds. On the other hand, sometimes an as-
pect of the defendant's history and personality will show he is too
evil to live. He may have a very long record of crime or may have
killed before.
Under this line of reasoning, however, not all defendants guilty
of murder or any other heinous offense deserve to be executed. As
between the two would-be robbers who enter the 7-Eleven store, the
one who plans to kill the clerk is more blameworthy than the one
who does not so intend but who panics and kills. Yet, in Pennsylva-
nia, both defendants are guilty of first degree murder and both are
subject to the death penalty. As between the mentally ill offender
and the mentally normal offender, the mentally normal offender is
the more blameworthy. Yet both are subject to execution. As be-
tween the sixteen year old offender and the thirty-five year old of-
fender, the thirty-five year old offender is the more blameworthy.
But in Pennsylvania both may be executed.
This sort of discussion makes proponents of the death penalty
nervous, though they do not actually deny its truth. Dr. van den
Haag writes that the only moral or legal "excuse" for crime con-
cerns a condition "beyond the control of the murderer, [which has]
unavoidably compelled him to commit the murder with which he is
charged."11 But Dr. van den Haag also acknowledges that
"[a]lthough the law must be discontinuous . ..life and people are
continuous for the most part." 12 He seems to understand that condi-
tions such as mental illness are to a certain extent within and beyond
the control of the murderer. Such conditions are more or less difficult
to control. The harder the mental condition is to control, the less
blameworthy the defendant. At some point, the mental condition is
such that execution is not just, though punishment is still merited.
This is the view of the American legal system. In a death pen-
alty case, once the prosecution has presented the defendant's crime
and past criminal record, the defendant is entitled to introduce evi-
dence of any aspect of his character or record, or circumstances of
does."
11. DEBATE, supra note 3, at 284.
12. Id. at 285.
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the offense that may suggest that he does not deserve to be exe-
cuted."3 The United States Supreme Court has rendered American
law "continuous" insofar as sanction is concerned. The defendant
may be legally responsible for his crime, so as to merit punishment,
but his responsibility may be sufficiently mitigated that the harshest
punishment is undeserved. From the perspective of American law,
some murderers do not deserve to be executed.
The court's accommodation of mitigating factors in the death
penalty process is not merely a compassionate happenstance. Insofar
as some legally culpable criminals are not sufficiently blameworthy
to deserve death, the acknowledgment of mitigating evidence is a
moral imperative for the proponent of the death penalty. Justice is
the fundamental ground of the death penalty. 4 If many who did not
deserve to die were executed, proponents would have to withdraw
their support.15
If this account of the position of death penalty proponents is
fair, proponents do face a crisis in their support for the death pen-
alty. Because of current practices, there is great reason to doubt the
effectiveness of the current death penalty system in selecting only
those defendants who deserve to die. There are impediments to the
investigation, presentation, consideration, and review of mitigating
evidence. I will set forth some of those impediments in Pennsylvania.
Further, difficult research remains to estimate how often such mis-
carriages of justice actually occur.
III. Systemic Flaws in the Pennsylvania Death Penalty System
Pennsylvania death penalty procedure" appears to be well
adapted to the selection of only those persons who deserve to be exe-
cuted. The death penalty statute limits death penalty consideration
to cases of first degree murder, 17 which in Pennsylvania is defined as
13. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
14. I do not mean that deterrence is not foremost in the minds of many proponents as a
justification for the death penalty. But even a deterrence theorist must decide whom to execute
and cannot do so without some understanding of justice. Why should we not execute the par-
ents of murderers, for example, if such execution would have great deterrent effect?
15. See DEBATE, supra note 3, at 55: "[Miscarriages of justice] weaken the argument of
retentionists who favor the death penalty for the guilty because it is just." Dr. van den Haag
does not necessarily agree, however, that the murderers described here do not deserve to be
executed. For a discussion of Dr. van den Haag's views on execution, see Ledewitz, The Mo-
rality of Capital Punishments: An Exchange, 29 DuQ. L. REv. 719 (1991).
16. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (Purdon 1987 & Supp. 1991); see also PA. R.
CRIM. P. 351-89.
17. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(1).
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intentional killing."' Thus, the justice of executing one who does not
himself kill nor intend to kill does not arise in Pennsylvania, though
it is an issue in other states. Section 9711 of the statute sets forth a
list of 16 aggravating circumstances,19 and without a finding of at
least one aggravating circumstance, the death penalty cannot be im-
posed.20 Prosecutors are limited to proving the existence of aggravat-
ing circumstances for which notice has been given to the defend-
ant.2' Finding an aggravating circumstance requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.22 In contrast to the prosecution's evidence, the de-
fendant's mitigating evidence is not limited to the statutory mitigat-
ing circumstances, but extends to "any . . . evidence of mitigation
concerning the character and record of the defendant and the cir-
cumstances of his offense."2" Mitigating circumstances may be
proved by merely a preponderance of the evidence 2 ' and notice need
not be given. The jury is instructed to weigh aggravation against
mitigation and to impose death only if there are no mitigating cir-
cumstances or if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the miti-
gating circumstances.25 In the case of deadlock, a life sentence is
imposed.2" Review of a death sentence is mandatory.2 7 Both the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court on appeal and the Governor before
signing an execution warrant have authority to review the cases and
weed out excessive or disproportionate outcomes.28
The death penalty statute and the implementing procedural
rules outline a process that seems fair to the defendant. Defendants
18. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(a) (Purdon 1981).
19. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d).
20. Id. § 9711(c)(1)(iv).
21. PA. R. CRIM. P. 352.
22. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iii) (Purdon 1987 & Supp. 1991).
23. Id. § 9711(e)(8).
24. Id. § 9711(c)(l)(iii).
25. Id. § 9711(c)(l(iv).
26. Id. § 9711(c)(1)(iv).
27. Id. § 9711(h). The review encompasses errors at trial as well.
28. Section 9711(h)(3) provides:
The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it affirms that:
(iii) the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases considering both the circumstances of the crime
and the character and record of the defendant.
The authority of the Governor in this regard, though not stated expressly in the statute, has
been acknowledged by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The statute states that upon affirm-
ance of a sentence of death, "a full and complete record" of the case is to be sent to the
Governor. This language alone suggests that the Governor should review the record in order to
make sure that the death penalty is appropriate given all the circumstances of the case. Justice
Hutchinson, in his plurality opinion in Commonwealth v. Holcomb, 508 Pa. 425, 498 A.2d 833
(1985), impliedly endorsed this view by referring to Section 9711 (i) as the "Governor's author-
ity to commute a sentence .... " Id. at 472, n.28, 498 A.2d at 857, n.28.
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who do not deserve the death penalty despite conviction of first de-
gree murder are given an opportunity to persuade the jury. Never-
theless, in practice, this system is subject to influences that under-
mine the reliability of decisions to impose the death penalty. These
attributes of the system, some inherent and some imposed by the
courts and others, create the risk that miscarriages of justice will
often occur in Pennsylvania.
A. Miscarriage of Justice in Pennsylvania Death Penalty Cases:
Three Examples
In 1988, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed sentences of
death on direct appeal in ten cases and reversed sentences of death
in two cases. Of the ten affirmances, at least three raise fundamental
issues of justice.
In Commonwealth v. Smith," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upheld a death sentence for a man with an IQ of 76.0 The evidence
recounted in the Court's opinion was that James Smith met with
Levi Rucker and Kimberleigh Green in Green's house to plan the
killing of Davis Kelly, who was suspected of having killed Ms.
Green's brother several months earlier. The plan was for Green to
lure the victim to a point near an alley, for Rucker to block Kelly's
escape route, and for Green to emerge from the alley to shoot Kelly.
The plan was carried out. Both Green and Rucker were permitted to
plead guilty to third degree murder in return for testimony against
Smith.
In sentencing the defendant to death, the jury found that there
were no mitigating circumstances."1 Although the court reversed the
finding of one aggravating circumstance-a significant history of vio-
lent felony convictions 2-the court upheld the finding of another ag-
gravating circumstance: the defendant knowingly created a great
29. 518 Pa. 15, 540 A.2d 246 (1988).
30. It may well be questioned how the following cases and others I will note raise issues
of justice? Perhaps many readers will consider James Smith and others to be appropriate sub-
jects for the death penalty. I have no objective standard by which to judge whether defendants
deserve to live. Once it is acknowledged that not all murderers deserve to be executed, the
actual, individual judgment is difficult to make and perhaps impossible to describe. Of course,
I believe that these considerations negate the death penalty as a criminal sanction. But for
purposes of this article, I am satisfied to identify cases that I believe most people, including
death penalty proponents, will find problematic.
31. Smith, 540 A.2d at 249-50.
32. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(9) (Purdon 1987 & Supp. 1991). Smith
had been convicted of aggravated assault and two misdemeanors arising out of a shooting in
1981. Smith, 518 Pa. at 23, 540 A.2d 260.
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risk of death to other persons during the shooting." This finding,
plus the finding of no mitigation, rendered death the mandatory pen-
alty. 4 Thus, the jury never balanced mitigation against aggravation.
One should not romanticize James Smith. The opinion shows he
is a dangerous person. Smith earlier had been convicted of aggra-
vated assault in the shooting of two people in an incident at a bar.
An eyewitness to the Kelly shooting testified she knew Smith and
was fearful of him.
Nevertheless, one wonders how James Smith could be viewed as
too evil to live. The jury ignored Smith's mental retardation com-
pletely and also ignored the influence of Green and Rucker in plan-
ning and carrying out the plan. It is certainly possible, if not in fact
likely, that Smith's mental incapacity, which was uncontradicted,
left Smith open to the suggestions of Green and Rucker. Smith is to
blame, but he is not so totally to blame in this case that death is
justified.
In Commonwealth v. Moser," the court upheld a death sen-
tence for a man found by the sentencing panel to have been under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and to
have had no prior criminal record. Leon Moser shot and killed his
ex-wife and two daughters outside Palm Sunday church services.
The evidence showed that Moser was distraught, depressed, and an-
gry over his recent divorce. He wrote a note indicating that his
daughters would be better off resting in peace with him than being
raised by his wife. Moser expressed a desire to be executed through-
out the appeal. Is this man too evil to live?
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Logan,86 the court upheld a death
sentence for a mentally ill man who instructed his attorney to pre-
sent no mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. On a bus, Lo-
gan committed a totally unprovoked attack with an ax on a stranger.
The evidence at trial showed that Logan had a history of treatment
for mental disorders. Logan was hospitalized in the care of psychia-
trists from the time of arrest until trial. Logan's behavior at the trial
included outbursts of laughter and threats to everyone in the court-
room, including the jury. The opinion of affirmance acknowledged
33. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(7). One of the bullets ricocheted off a solid
surface and another passed through the victim and was never recovered.
34. See id. § 9711(c)(I)(iv): "the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unani-
mously finds at least one aggravating circumstance ... and no mitigating circumstance
.... .1 Id.
35. 519 Pa. 441, 549 A.2d 76 (1988).
36. 519 Pa. 607, 549 A.2d 531 (1988).
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that the defendant suffered from a mental illness, but the court
found Logan competent to stand trial and competent to decide to
introduce no mitigating evidence.3 7 The jury, in finding no mitiga-
tion, simply ignored the evidence that was introduced at the trial. 8
Is Logan too evil to live?
The Smith, Moser, and Logan cases are not representative of all
or even most death penalty cases. These cases do show, however, that
miscarriage of justice occurs in Pennsylvania. Thus, the problems in
the Pennsylvania death penalty process that I relate below may
mean in some cases the difference between life and death by
execution.
But aside from indicating that reform of the process is crucial in
a few cases, Smith, Moser, and Logan should not be discounted as
total departures from an otherwise reliable capital process. For in-
stance, the opinions in Moser and Logan are not the only instances
in which the court has affirmed a sentence of death for a mentally ill
person. Unfortunately, until the effective date of Rule 358,"8 which
created a verdict form in death penalty cases that lists mitigating
circumstances found by any juror, it could not be said with certainty
which mitigating circumstances had been found to be present in a
case. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had occasion
earlier to consider the cases of clearly mentally ill defendants.
In Commonwealth v. Fahy,'0 the torture killing of a twelve year
old girl, the court upheld a sentence of death despite jury findings"
that the defendant "was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance"4 2 and that the defendant's "capacity to ap-
preciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired.' 3 In Common-
wealth v. Banks,"' the court affirmed death sentences for the murder
of thirteen people, mostly members of the defendant's own family.
The jury found that the defendant was suffering from extreme
mental or emotional disturbance. It was conceded by all the experts
who testified that defendant suffered from a serious mental defect,
37. Id. at 636, 549 A.2d at 542 (evidence of intent is sufficient despite illness), 544
(counsel not ineffective for obeying client's instructions not to plead mitigation).
38. One basis of affirmance of Logan's sentence was the court's confidence that the jury
understood that all the mental health evidence before it could be considered in determining
mitigation. Id. at 634, 549 A.2d at 544-45.
39. PA. R. CRIM. P. 358, effective date July 1, 1989.
40. 512 Pa. 298, 516 A.2d 689 (1986).
41. It is not clear how the jury findings were determined.
42. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(2).
43. See id. § 9711(e)(3).
44. 513 Pa. 318, 521 A.2d 1 (1987).
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which led him to want to kill his children rather than see them grow
up in a "racist society."' 45 The defendant's bizarre behavior in the
courtroom included his insistence that previously excluded, inflam-
matory photographs of the bodies of the victims be shown to the jury
in order to prove a conspiracy against him and "to pull the mask off
the face of Devil . . . ."6 In Commonwealth v. Terry,41 a prisoner
serving a life sentence killed a prison guard. It is not clear what
mitigation the jury found, but it seems undisputed that the defend-
ant suffered from organic brain disease. The jury's sentencing deci-
sion perhaps reflected the feeling expressed in Chief Justice Nix'
concurrence: "Where one confined in a correctional institution con-
tinues to be incorrigible and presents a danger to that population, we
have justified the extermination of this tortured soul."
48
In recent cases in which mitigation findings are identifiable,
mental impairment was found by the sentencing judge in one case
4'
and was not found, despite expert evidence, in two others.' 0 In Com-
monwealth v. Hughes,1 the jury found no mitigating circumstances
despite evidence of the defendant's mental impairment and despite
his minority and low IQ. 2 As in Smith, the jury's failure to find this
evidence mitigating rendered the death penalty mandatory. Re-
cently, in Commonwealth v. Heidnik,"8 the sentencing jury rejected
mitigating circumstances relating to mental, illness despite uncontra-
dicted evidence that came even from Commonwealth witnesses that
defendant suffered from long-term schizophrenia.' 4
An estimate of the number of prisoners on Pennsylvania's death
row who do not deserve to be executed would require a thorough
study of each defendant's case. No such study, however, has been or
is likely to be conducted. A case-by-case study would be difficult be-
cause mitigating evidence often is not investigated by trial counsel,
45. Id. at 331, 521 A.2d at 7.
46. Id. at 363 n.1, 521 A.2d at 24 n.1 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
47. 513 Pa. 381, 521 A.2d 398 (1987).
48. Id. at 410, 526 A.2d at 413.
49. Commonwealth v. Watson, 523 Pa. 51, 565 A.2d 132 (1989).
50. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 555 A.2d 1264 (1989); Commonwealth v.
Henry, 524 Pa. 135, 569 A.2d 929 (1990).
51. 521 Pa. 423, 555 A.2d 1264 (1989).
52. At the time of the crime, defendant was 17 years old and had an IQ of 81. Id. at
444, 555 A.2d at 1275.
53. 587 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1991).
54. Id. at 692. Of course considering the horrifying torture murders committed by Gary
Heidnik, the proponent may assert that obviously Heidnik deserves to be executed despite his
illness. This may be true, but it is not what the jury decided. The jury decided Heidnik is not
mentally ill, which is surely false.
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or is investigated only superficially.55
No doubt, in the majority of death penalty cases, a proponent of
the death penalty would conclude that the defendant probably de-
serves to be executed. But from the proponent's perspective, if one
must wonder about the result in a significant number of cases, sys-
temic sources of injustice in Pennsylvania death penalty cases cannot
be ignored. The proponent of the death penalty must then ask, how
many of the prisoners on Pennsylvania's death row really are too evil
to live? What measures will prevent the condemnation and execution
of both those innocent of any crime and those who, though guilty,
nevertheless do not deserve to be executed?
B. Miscarriage of Justice in Pennsylvania: Some Possible Causes
1. Prosecutorial Discretion to seek the Death Penalty.-A
majority of the United States Supreme Court has upheld the consti-
tutionality of prosecutorial discretion in the decision to seek the
death penalty. a6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled simi-
larly under state law.
5 7
Aside from issues of potential discrimination, racial or sexual, in
the prosecutorial selection of capital cases, the issue from the per-
spective of unjust imposition of the death penalty is whether prosecu-
tors choose only those cases in which the sanction of death would be
deserved.
No systematic studies of capital charging decisions exist in
Pennsylvania today. But several factors would tempt a prosecutor to
seek the death penalty in any possible capital case, whether or not
55. During the 1988-1990 period, it appears that little or no mitigating evidence was
introduced in seven cases affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v.
Blystone, 519 Pa. 450, 549 A.2d 81 (1988), Commonwealth v. Wallace, 522 Pa. 297, 561 A.2d
719 (1989), Commonwealth v. Bryant, 524 Pa. 564, 574 A.2d 590 (1990), Commonwealth v.
Appel, 517 Pa. 529, 539 A.2d 780 (1988), Commonwealth v. Thomas, 522 Pa. 256, 561 A.2d
699 (1989), Commonwealth v. Tedford, 523 Pa. 305, 567 A.2d 610 (1989), Commonwealth v.
Logan, 519 Pa. 607, 549 A.2d 531 (1988). It is impossible to calculate exactly the amount of
effort put into presenting mitigating circumstances in the remaining twenty-four cases.
Occasionally, surprising fact situations are recounted in the opinions. Simon Pirela, for
example, was given the death penalty for killing a man he sincerely believed had caused the
death of his brother through a drug overdose. Commonwealth v. Pirela, 510 Pa. 43, 507 A.2d
23 (1986). Henry Carpenter was given the death penalty for killing a man who had been
harassing and threatening him for months and had even broken his jaw, because the girlfriend
of the victim had gone to live with Carpenter. Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 511 Pa. 429, 515
A.2d 531 (1986).
56. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199, 225 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, J.J. and opinion of White, J., joined by Burger, C.J. and Rehnquist, J.).
57. Commonwealth v. DeHart, 512 Pa. 235, 262, 516 A.2d 656, 670 (1986), cert. de-
nied, 107 S.Ct. 3241 (1987) and Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 546 A.2d 1101
(1988), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1169 (1990).
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the prosecutor believes execution would be a just outcome.
The most obvious benefit to prosecutors seeking a death quali-
fied jury5" is obtaining a jury that is likely to convict. Social science
studies recounted in Lockhart v. McCree59 strongly suggest that
death qualified juries are more likely to convict at the guilt/inno-
cence stage of a trial than is'a non-death-qualified jury.60 The
United States Supreme Court did not actually reject these studies,61
but rather found that the people excluded from the jury are not a
"distinctive group" for representative-jury purposes and that convic-
tion-prove juries are not unconstitutionally partial.65
Prosecutors also obtain a political advantage when they seek the
death penalty even in dubious cases. A prosecutor may run for a
higher office or for reelection in part on the basis of how often his
office sought the death penalty. 8
The prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty in a case in
which the defendant may not deserve to be executed would be of no
importance if. the sentencing system could always be relied on to
reach the right result. For reasons I discuss below, however, confi-
dence in the Pennsylvania death penalty system to achieve reliable
results is not necessarily warranted. For one thing, once any aggra-
vating circumstance is proved, the death penalty is mandatory unless
mitigation is also proved. The jury is never actually asked whether
the death penalty is warranted in the particular case. Thus, the rob-
ber who panics and shoots the clerk in the 7-Eleven store may be
found guilty of first degree murder even though a non-death quali-
58. Death qualification refers to the process by which many opponents of the death pen-
alty are purged from jury venires in death penalty cases.
59. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
60. Death qualified juries are, of course, also more likely to impose the death penalty,
which is the point of death qualification. But in a marginal death penalty case, the prosecutor
may be more interested in the conviction rather than the penalty.
61. Actually, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion tried to have it both ways: the studies
are not valid and they are in any event irrelevant:
Having identified some of the more serious problems with McCree's studies,
however, we will assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies are both
methodologically valid and adequate to establish that "death qualification" in
fact produces juries somewhat more "conviction-prone" than "non-death-quali-
fied" juries. We hold, nonetheless, that the Constitution does not prohibit the
States from "death qualifying" juries in capital cases.
476 U.S. at 173.
I have yet to meet a lawyer or judge who doubts that death-qualified juries are more
likely to convict. It is the prosecutor's belief that is likely to cause them to seek the death
penalty in order to obtain a death-qualified jury.
62. 476 U.S. at 175-79.
63. One would think that seeking the death penalty but not obtaining it would be de-
rided politically as an expensive failure. But the prosecutor can blame "soft" courts and de-
fense attorneys for his failure.
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fled jury would have convicted him of only second degree murder.
He may be sentenced to death simply because there is no mitigating
factor in his favor. In such a case, no one has decided that the de-
fendant deserved to die. 4
2. Pretrial Detention.-Under Pennsylvania law, persons
charged with capital crimes are ineligible for bail.6" For this reason,
once someone is charged in a capital case, he will stay in jail at least
until the case comes to trial.
My point has nothing to do with the unfairness of keeping peo-
ple in jail before they are convicted of any crime. Most defendants in
capital cases would not make bail even under the ordinary standards
of "threat to flee" or "danger to the community." The problem in
capital cases is different and it has to do with the need to explore
mitigation to decide whether the prisoner deserves to be executed.
Studies have shown that defendants who are out of jail on bail
pending trial have a better chance of obtaining a verdict of not guilty
than do defendants who stay in jail.'6 There are many possible ex-
planations for this observed relationship: for example, the strength or
weakness of the prosecution's case may be a factor in setting bail.
But it is sometimes hypothesized that defendants who are out of jail
and living in the community strengthen their cases.6 7 These defend-
ants may round up alibi witnesses, discover weaknesses in the prose-
cution's case, or simply hound their attorneys into effective prepara-
tion. Defendants who remain in jail pending trial can do none of
these things and are reduced to waiting for others to aid them. In the
case of the attorney, particularly the appointed attorney or public
64. Although no one can know, I wonder if something like this occurred in Common-
wealth v. Porter, 524 Pa. 162, 569 A.2d 942, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 593, rehearing denied,
111 S. Ct. 307 (1990), an ordinary, perhaps unplanned, robbery-killing, which though suffi-
ciently heinous to warrant Pennsylvania's alternative penalty of life imprisonment without pa-
role, is not the sort of case in which the death penalty is usually sought or imposed.
65, PA. CONST. art. I, § 14, provides in part: "All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great .... "
Before the advent of PA. R. CRIM. P. 352, a petition for bail was sometimes the only way to
discover which aggravating circumstance the Commonwealth was intending to utilize. The
Commonwealth would have to show that the case was "capital" in order to prevent any bail
from being set. While this peculiar procedural arrangement was not the subject of much litiga-
tion, in a memorandum opinion in 1982, Commonwealth v. Vedam, 245 Misc. Dkt. 13 (De-
cember 21, 1982), Superior Court Judge Spaeth did require the Commonwealth to demon-
strate the prima facie presence of at least one aggravating circumstance before bail could be
denied.
66. See, e.g., Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641, 642-43
(1964).
67. See Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study (For-
ward), 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 631, 633 (1964).
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defender, the resources of time, money, and investigative skill may
be in short supply. Even strong family or community ties may be of
no avail to the defendant who is in jail pending trial.
If there is any truth to the no-bail effect, the situation is magni-
fied immensely in a death penalty case. The factual issue in most
criminal cases is relatively simple: did the defendant commit the
crime? The defense argues that the prosecution cannot prove that
any crime occurred, cannot prove that the defendant is the one who
did the act, and cannot prove that the act was committed with the
requisite mental state. In addition, counsel may try to prove an af-
firmative defense. Investigation focusing on the defendant is a lim-
ited undertaking.
In contrast, at the sentencing stage of a death penalty case, the
focus is almost entirely upon the defendant-his history, his charac-
ter, his life in general. This change in focus is understandable be-
cause the question at the sentencing stage is whether the defendant
deserves to be executed. But this new focus places enormous respon-
sibility on the defense to investigate and present to the jury an ac-
count of the defendant's life and character.
The jailed defendant has great difficulty putting together a case
for mitigation. He has to rely on the efforts of his attorney, friends,
and family to gather the information needed. If the defendant's so-
cial ties are weak or if his attorney is uninterested, overworked, inex-
perienced, or simply ineffective, the case for mitigation will not be
prepared adequately.
The obvious consequence of poor investigation for the defense is
that the jury will not come to know the defendant's record and char-
acter.68 From the death penalty proponent's perspective this failure
is significant. If the point of utilizing the death penalty is to select
those persons who are too evil to live, and if this judgment is to be
made not only based upon what the defendant did, but on the sort of
person he is, then building a solid case for mitigation is essential.
The lack or denial of bail undermines the reliability of this process.
3. Poverty.-Just as pretrial detention can handicap the prep-
aration of mitigation, the defendant's poverty can also interfere. Pov-
erty operates as a handicap in two ways. First, lack of funds can
prevent the defendant from hiring the experts he may need to help
prepare his case and may prevent the procurement of witnesses in
68. Of course, another result may be a greater probability that innocent persons will be
convicted.
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mitigation. Second, poverty prevents the defendant from hiring his
own attorney.
In terms of financial assistance for preparing the case in mitiga-
tion, the formal law and the informal practice diverge. In two 1989
capital cases, Commonwealth v. Strong 9 and Commonwealth v.
Williams,7" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the Com-
monwealth has no obligation to furnish an investigator to help the
defendant develop exculpatory evidence on the issue of guilt. In
Commonwealth v. Yarris,7" an earlier case, the court had pro-
nounced an even broader rule, which encompassed the assistance of
"experts" generally in the development of mitigation.72
If the rules announced in Strong, Williams, and Yarris were
followed scrupulously, proponents of the death penalty, on this
ground alone, would have to worry about the reliability of Pennsyl-
vania death penalty cases. Without access to defense investigation,
the system runs the risk of convicting the innocent. Without experts,
particularly mental health experts, the system runs the risk of con-
demning and executing those not truly deserving of the death pen-
alty. The same is true of funds for investigation and transportation
of mitigation witnesses from out of state.
Fortunately, it may be that the lower courts do not follow this
line of cases. In my own experience consulting in death penalty cases
throughout the Commonwealth, most trial judges do provide defend-
ants with some expert assistance and financial support. It is instruc-
tive that in both Strong and Williams, some investigative expertise
was provided to the defendant. 3 In Yarris, no request for psychiatric
assistance was made until a later point in the proceedings, at which
point the request apparently was granted.1'
With respect to appointed counsel and public defender represen-
tation, one need not denigrate the efforts of trial counsel to note that
the rich and modestly well-off are absent from death row. It is true,
I suppose, that poor people commit more murders than do the rich. I
suppose it is also true that the poor predominate in the prisons as
69. 522 Pa. 445, 563 A.2d 479 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1536 (1990).
70. 522 Pa. 287, 561 A.2d 714 (1989).
71. 519 Pa. 571, 549 A.2d 513 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989).
72. In Yarris, the issue was whether counsel was ineffective in seeking appointment of a
psychiatrist for the penalty hearing. The court's opinion acknowledged that the prior Pennsyl-
vania rule of no-assistance, to which counsel referred because it was existing law, had since
been changed by the contrary holding in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Therefore, the
court held that counsel had not been ineffective. See 519 Pa. at 606, 549 A.2d at 530-31.
73. Strong, 522 Pa. at 460-61, 563 A.2d at 487; Williams, 522 Pa. at 294, 561 A.2d at
717.
74. Yarris, 519 Pa. at 605-06, 549 A.2d at 530-31.
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well as on death row. But my point is not that the death penalty
discriminates against the poor in favor of the rich. It is just as likely
that the rich receive adequate representation, expert assistance, and
a detailed mitigation presentation, which convinces the jury quite
fairly that the defendant is not too evil to live. Conversely, inexperi-
enced appointed counsel1 5 and overworked public defenders may not
always present all that could have been presented to the jury. The
result may be, and certainly the risk exists, that some of the poor on
death row may not deserve to be executed.
4. Attorney Performance.-In many death penalty cases, de-
fense attorneys do not perform adequately. 76 The result is the death
sentence in cases in which better representation might have obtained
a life sentence for the defendant.
The possibility that a condemned prisoner could have received a
life sentence is a spectre for the proponent of the death penalty.
Some defendants are fortunate to have outstanding legal representa-
tion. These defendants may receive life sentences and may actually
deserve to die. But obviously it would be unjust to execute someone
who does not deserve to die simply because his attorney failed to
prepare and/or present the full story of the defendant's life.
The factors that cause poor attorney performance in death pen-
alty cases are no mystery. The best attorneys, even the best criminal
attorneys, often do not take criminal case appointments, in part, be-
cause of money. In Allegheny County, for example, criminal lawyers
in death penalty cases have complained that the maximum amount
that will be paid for a homicide case is four thousand dollars. The
hourly rates for defense representation are either $50 or $25, de-
pending on whether the work is performed in court or out of court.78
Because attorneys have only their time to sell, there is a limit as to
how much time an attorney can afford to devote to a case when the
75. There are no standards for appointment of counsel in death penalty cases in Pennsyl-
vania, except in Philadelphia.
76. For an overview of the adequate representation problem in death penalty cases na-
tionally, see the Report of the American Bar Association's Recommendations Concerning
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State
Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 62-92 (1990). The overall conclusion of the Report
on this issue may be summed up as follows: "Serious deficiencies in the quality of representa-
tion from pretrial proceedings through post-conviction review frequently undermine the process
of determining on whom the death penalty is imposed." Id. at 63-64,
77. See Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Standards (copy on file at the
Dickinson Law Review office). The maximum payment can be increased by a majority of a
three-judge panel appointed by the Administrative judge. See id.
78. Id.
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maximum return is four thousand dollars. Of course, some appointed
attorneys spend hundreds of hours preparing death penalty cases, de-
spite the low pay. But even for these dedicated individuals, the num-
ber of death penalty appointments must be limited if the rent is to be
paid.
The problem for public defenders is not as much lack of money
as it is lack of time. It is not unusual for a public defender in any big
city homicide unit to have one or two homicide cases per month.
That sort of caseload makes trial preparation difficult. Preparation
for a capital case is more difficult than preparation for any other
case because investigation of mitigation is extremely time-consum-
ing. To complicate matters, the attorney may not know how to go
about gathering information about the defendant's life; it is a task
unlike most other trial undertakings. Finally, in part for reasons
stated above,79 the defense attorney may receive little or no help
from the defendant, his family, or his friends.
In Pennsylvania, the problems of attorney performance are ex-
acerbated by the almost total absence of programs to train attorneys
for death penalty litigation. Recently, a task force organized by
Chief Justice Robert N.C. Nix of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
and Third Circuit Court of Appeals Chief Judge A. Leon Higginbot-
ham recommended that the General Assembly create a publicly
funded agency8" to provide such training at the trial, appellate, and
collateral litigation stage.81 The prospects for enactment of this mod-
est proposal are not promising.
It is not possible to describe the overall level of attorney compe-
tency in death penalty cases. For example, in seven out of thirty-one
death penalty cases affirmed during 1988-1990, little or no mitigat-
ing evidence was introduced.82 At first glance, this would seem to
indicate serious defense attorney dereliction, especially given the
mandatory language in the death penalty statute if an aggravating
circumstance is found; a failure to introduce mitigation is usually
fatal. But this stark statistic is actually not that meaningful. On the
one hand, it does not mean that the defense attorneys in the remain-
79. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
80. REPORT OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY LITIGATION IN PENNSYL-
VANIA (copy on file at the Dickinson Law Review office). Although the Report identifies itself
as co-sponsored by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
it is unclear precisely how the Task Force was created.
81. See id. at iii. It is not clear from the Report that the agency is to provide such
training; it is clear that the training is mandatory, id. at 26, and that the agency is to enforce
the standards of qualification.
82. See supra note 55.
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ing twenty-four cases did much investigating on behalf of their cli-
ents. On the other hand, the failure to present mitigation may have
resulted from the defendant's failure to cooperate or from the de-
fendant's express wish, matters that are addressed below. It may
even be argued that perhaps there was nothing mitigating in the de-
fendant's life, though I have never come across such a case and I do
not believe there is such a person.
Despite the difficulty of overall assessment of attorney perform-
ance, it is clear that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will not re-
quire meaningful preparation from defense attorneys.8 In Common-
wealth v. Williams," some mitigation was evidently introduced.85
Nevertheless, the court's description of what the attorney actually
did to investigate mitigation suggests little effort by the attorney.,
The record in the instant case reveals that trial counsel, on
a number of occasions, advised appellant that he should be pre-
pared, in the event of his conviction, to supply counsel with fac-
tors about his life that could be seen as mitigating. Appellant
failed to provide such information.
8 7
What possible use were such desultory conversations between
the defendant and his attorney? Under Pennsylvania practice, the
same jury that decides guilt decides the penalty. 8 Obviously, the
trial judge is not going to continue the case upon conviction in order
to begin the process of investigation of mitigation." And considering
the danger to the defendant of the failure to present mitigation, how
could the attorney have failed to press this point with urgency? The
attorney needed leads for mitigation months before the sentencing
hearing in order to present the evidence in a convincing way. After
all, the defense does have a burden of proof at the sentencing phase90
and it is not certain that a jury would believe mitigating evidence
83. I am not as familiar with the opinions of affirmance before 1988, but there is no
reason to think there was any great change in attorney performance in the cases decided
recently.
84. 524 Pa. 218, 570 A.2d 75 (1990).
85. The defendant's age (eighteen) was apparently argued to the jury as being mitigat-
ing. Id. at 234, 570 A.2d at 82. The opinion is silent about what other mitigation was
introduced.
86. That is, if in fact this is all the attorney did. It may be that the attorney was dili-
gently investigating other sources of mitigation.
87. 524 Pa. at 234, 570 A.2d at 83.
88. 42 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(1) (Purdon 1987 & Supp. 1991).
89. Cf. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 519 Pa. 571, 549 A.2d 513 (1988), cert. denied,491
U.S. 910 (1989) (not error to begin sentencing hearing eleven minutes after jury returns ver-
dict of guilt).
90. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (c)(l)(iii) ("preponderance of the evidence").
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from the defendant without corroborating witnesses.
Part of the problem here is the court's willingness to tolerate
inadequate attorney preparation. Justice McDermott's majority
opinion in Williams said this of the attorney's approach to
mitigation:
While it is true that any fact or circumstance about the defend-
ant may be presented to a jury as a potential mitigating factor,
it is not the duty of a trial attorney to list for the defendant an
exhaustive list of potential areas of mitigation; such a list would
go on forever. 91
But if discussing mitigation with the defendant is not the de-
fense attorney's job, what is his job? How else can defendant under-
stand what sort of evidence is appropriate or needed? My point is
not so much what William's attorney did, for he may have done
more than the opinion reflects. The point is that the court apparently
thought the attorney did nothing at all by way of preparation; yet
the court was willing to affirm the death penalty. Not only was this
potentially unjust to Williams himself, but the low standard of prep-
aration for defense attorneys set by the Williams opinion is poten-
tially unjust if applied in future cases.
Williams is a particularly dramatic case. But it is not unique. In
Commonwealth v. Buehl,"a the entire sentencing hearing apparently
consisted of testimony from the defendant to establish his age and
drug use. No corroborating witnesses were called, nor expert wit-
nesses to help the jury put the evidence in context. No other infor-
mation about the defendant was introduced. The Buehl court af-
firmed the trial court partly because of the view that there might
have been no mitigating evidence. s
In Commonwealth v. Pirela,04 defense counsel argued mitiga-
tion but apparently introduced no witnesses at all. Here again, the
court affirmed the sentence of death because of the defense's failure
on appeal to show what could or should have been done.
9 5
In Commonwealth v. Porter,9 it appears that only the defend-
ant's mother and perhaps the defendant himself testified at the sen-
91. Commonwealth v. Williams, 524 Pa. 218, 234, 570 A.2d 75, 83 (1990) (emphasis in
original).
92. 510 Pa. 363, 508 A.2d 1167 (1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).
93. Id. at 382, 508 A.2d at 1177.
94. 510 Pa. 43, 507 A.2d 23 (1986).
95. Id. at 59, 507 A.2d at 31.
96. 524 Pa. 162, 569 A.2d 942 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 307, reh'g denied, II1 S.
Ct. 593 (1990).
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tencing hearing. What is remarkable about the case is that the testi-
mony of the defendant's mother at the sentencing hearing seems to
have raised issues of mental illness that had not been investigated by
counsel. After the defendant was sentenced to death by the jury, but
before formal sentencing, the trial judge ordered a psychiatric
exam.97 This may have been an admirable attempt by the trial judge
to protect the defendant, but it in no way explains why the defense
attorney did not even attempt to pursue this line of evidence prior to
the sentencing hearing. Justice McDermott's opinion for the court
suggests that the existence of psychiatric records "was hidden from
[the attorney]."9 But this comment can hardly be true since the
defendant's mother's testimony raised the mental health issue in the
first place.
In Commonwealth v. Yarris,99 counsel also presented only the
defendant's testimony and that of his mother. Although the issue of
the defendant's mental state was raised by lay witnesses at the trial
itself,100 none of these witnesses testified at the sentencing phase, at
which stage the evidence would have been more clearly relevant than
at the trial itself. Counsel did not even attempt to introduce expert
testimony for the defendant on the mental state issue.101
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cannot be relied upon to im-
prove attorney performance. In the first place, as demonstrated by
Williams,"0 2 the court does not demand high performance from de-
fense attorneys. In the second place, Justice Flaherty's opinion in
Yarris shows an unwillingness to find prejudice even when the
court's minimal expectations of performance are not met. A psychi-
atric exam was held in Yarris pursuant to a remand order based on'
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The results of the psychi-
atric exam were not wholly favorable; the defendant was described,
inter alia, as an "anti-social" person who suffers from a "severe per-
sonality disorder."'' 0 But the evidence would also have documented
drug use and perhaps the defendant's mental illness and suicide at-
97. Id. at 171, 569 A.2d at 946.
98. Id.
99. 519 Pa. 571, 549 A.2d 513 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989).
100. Id. at 605-06, 549 A.2d at 530-31.
101. There is a question whether a request for a psychiatric examination would have
been granted. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. It is also no doubt true that the
lay evidence at trial was incorporated into the sentencing hearing record. But the failure to
make a request and the failure to tailor the evidence to the sentencing hearing itself demon-
strates a fundamental lack of attorney preparation.
102. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
103. Yarris, 519 Pa. at 606, 549 A.2d at 531.
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tempts as well. 10 The decision to present this evidence should have
been made by well-prepared defense counsel rather than by the court
in hindsight.
The Williams court engaged in similar second guessing in hold-
ing that somewhat equivocal evidence of prison adjustment would
not have helped Williams' case at the sentencing hearing.' But all
defendants at the sentencing phase stand convicted of first degree
murder. Presumably, the jury is not expecting testimony that such a
defendant is a person of sound character-he obviously is not or he
would not have committed murder. Presumably, the jury is asking
only whether the defendant is too evil to live. Even equivocal miti-
gating evidence can shed positive light on that question.
The point of recounting episodes from these cases is to show
poor performance by defense counsel in the investigation and presen-
tation of mitigating evidence. I am not suggesting that these particu-
lar defendants do not deserve to be executed from the perspective of
the death penalty proponent. The psychiatric exam that did finally
take place in Porter, for example, revealed no psychiatric condition
nor the existence of any past psychiatric records.106 But without ag-
gressive and competent investigation of mitigation, a complete judg-
ment about the defendant is impossible. Unless all persons who com-
mit a capital crime deserve to be executed, a full exploration of the
presence of mitigation is critical. If defense attorneys do not under-
take such investigation, and if the courts do not react to this failure,
the reliability of sentencing is seriously compromised.
There is one additional factor in Pennsylvania death penalty
practice that limits effective representation-the defendant himself.
In 1987, in Commonwealth v. Crawley,10 7 the court seemed to create
a special colloquy-waiver procedure to be used whenever no mitigat-
ing evidence is introduced at the sentencing hearing. 0 8 While the
colloquy approach does not seem to have worked, the structure of the
colloquy as announced in Crawley did suggest that the decision not
to introduce mitigating evidence is the defendant's choice.'09 Appel-
104. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 519 Pa. 571, 605, 549 A.2d 513, 531, cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3201 (1989).
105. Commonwealth v. Williams, 524 Pa. 218, 570 A.2d 75, 83 (1990).
106. Commonwealth v. Porter, 524 Pa. 162, 171, 569 A.2d 942, 946 (1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 307, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 593 (1990).
107. 514 Pa. 539, 526 A.2d 334 (1987).
108. Id. at 550 n.1, 526 A.2d 340 n.l.
109. The opinion described the colloquy as follows:
During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel strenuously argued against the
Commonwealth's evidence of aggravating circumstances. No evidence of miti-
gating circumstances was introduced, however. Because of the finality of a death
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late cases in which defense counsel has filed no brief and raised no
arguments for the defendant 10 reinforce the view that the decision
to oppose the death penalty rests with the defendant.
The suggestion that counsel must follow the defendant's wishes
at trial or on appeal has not been expressly held by the court, how-
ever, and may not represent the Pennsylvania rule."' In Common-
wealth v. Moser,"52 arguments were made and an appellate brief ap-
parently was filed despite the desire of the defendant to be executed.
Filing a brief despite the defendant's wishes is certainly in keeping
with the death penalty statute and the court's practice, both of
which provide the same appeal for defendants who desire execution
and those who do not."' Counsel's action in Moser of filing a brief
despite the defendant's wishes is the only course consistent with the
conduct of normal appellate review required by the statute and
promised by the court in Appel. No doubt the court in good faith
believes it can provide robust review without defense counsel, simply
by reviewing the record. But this is not true. No one can serve as
both judge and defense attorney. In terms of mitigation at trial, the
Crawley colloquy is aimed only at ensuring that the defendant
agrees with the decision not to introduce mitigation. The colloquy
sentence and the potential for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in sub-
sequent P.C.H.A. proceedings under such circumstances, we direct that hence-
forth a trial judge conduct an in-chambers colloquy with the Defendant in the
presence of counsel to determine that the Defendant himself has chosen not to
submit evidence of mitigation and that he is aware that the verdict must be a
sentence of death if the jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstances. While a trial court's failure to conduct such a colloquy
will not preclude such an inquiry if a claim of ineffectiveness is raised later in a
P.C.H.A. proceeding, such a colloquy will serve to insure the integrity of a sen-
tence of death if a defendant and his counsel are or are not in agreement on the
advisability of introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances. We caution,
however, that ineffectiveness of counsel will not be presumed simply because no
mitigating evidence was introduced.
Id.
110. See Commonwealth v. Appel, 517 Pa. 529, 539 A.2d 780 (1988), in which the
defendant waived counsel at all stages, expressed his desire to be executed, and no appellate
brief was filed by defense counsel; Commonwealth v. Heidnik, 587 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1991), in
which there was representation by counsel, but counsel was instructed not to pursue an appeal
and followed the defendant's instructions. In neither Appel nor Heidnik did the court suggest
any fault in counsel's decision.
11. See Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174 (1978) (client in-
struction does not preclude defense attorney's constitutional challenge to death penalty stat-
ute), which was decided under the prior statute.
112. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
113. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)(1) (Purdon 1987 & Supp. 1991) ("auto-
matic review"); Commonwealth v. Appel, 517 Pa. 529, 531, 539 A.2d 780, 781 (1988): "Nev-
ertheless, automatic review by this Court in all cases in which the sentence of death has been
imposed is an integral and absolutely essential procedural safeguard prescribed by the legisla-
ture in the enactment of Pennsylvania's death penalty statute .... "
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does not bar defense counsel from investigating and presenting miti-
gation, other than the defendant's own testimony.
Letting the defendant decide whether to introduce mitigation or
pursue an appeal, if this turns out to be the Pennsylvania rule,
should raise two objections from proponents of the death penalty.
First, the defendant is not necessarily the best person to determine if
he is too evil to live. Whether an individual has a moral right to
commit suicide, he certainly has no right to execution by the State.
The proponent of the death penalty must ensure that only those de-
serving of execution are executed. If the defendant prevents the sen-
tencer from hearing truthful mitigation, or prevents the courts from
reviewing the outcome, there is an increased risk that one who does
not deserve to be executed will be condemned.
Second, giving the defendant control over mitigation and appeal
may represent manipulation of, or misunderstanding by, the defend-
ant. In the seven cases during 1988-1990 in which little or no miti-
gating evidence was introduced, " two cases seem to involve the de-
fendant's free choice." 5 In Commonwealth v. Logan,"6 however, the
court was dealing with an obviously mentally unbalanced person." 7
In Commonwealth v. Blystone," 8 Commonwealth v. Wallace,"9 and
Commonwealth v. Bryant'20 there do not seem to have been collo-
quies conducted on the issue of mitigation.
In one case in which some mitigating evidence was introduced,
Commonwealth v. Holloway,121 the court's decision suggests why de-
fendants may sometimes "decide" to forego mitigation. In Holloway,
the defendant refused to request a continuance in order to obtain
mitigation witnesses.' 22 The opinion is silent, however, about why a
continuance might have been needed, or whether counsel's investiga-
tion of mitigation had been conducted expeditiously. There is no rea-
son why a capital defendant should be forced to choose between a
speedy trial and an effective presentation of mitigation.
5. Jury Selection.-The process of "death-qualifying" the jury
in capital cases, which was upheld by the United States Supreme
114. See supra note 55.
115. Commonwealth v. Tedford, 523 Pa. 305, 567 A.2d 610 (1989); Commonwealth v.
Appel, 517 Pa. 529, 539 A.2d 780 (1988).
116. 519 Pa. 607, 549 A.2d 531 (1988).
117. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
118. 519 Pa. 450, 549 A.2d 81 (1988).
119. 522 Pa. 297 561 A.2d 719 (1989).
120. 524 Pa. 564, 574 A.2d 590 (1990).
121. 524 Pa. 342, 572 A.2d 687 (1990).
122. Id. at 352, 572 A.2d at 692.
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Court in Lockhart v. McCree,'23 seriously skews results in death
penalty cases and undermines any confidence that the death penalty
process will select only those defendants who are so evil that they
deserve to be executed. First, death qualified juries are more likely to
convict or, presumably, to convict of a more culpable degree of guilt
than are non-death qualified juries. 24 Thus, the risk of executing
persons innocent of any crime, or innocent of any capital crime, is
greater than the risk of convicting the innocent in other types of
criminal cases.
Second, the moral judgment of the jury as to whether the de-
fendant deserves to be executed is also affected by the absence of
death penalty opponents from the jury.'26 If we could successfully
ask opponents of the death penalty to accept the proposition that
some persons deserve to be executed, the jury decisions that would
result from including opponents of the death penalty on the panel
might reflect sounder moral judgments. Speaking as an opponent of
the death penalty, I can certainly distinguish between the condemna-
tion of most capital defendants and the condemnation of a Ronald
Logan or a George Banks.
I am not suggesting that opponents of the death penalty actu-
ally be included in the ultimate decision whether to impose the death
penalty. Even if a promise to consider the death penalty were made
in good faith, it would represent inhuman loyalty to abstract princi-
ples to expect the opponent to keep the promise under the pressure of
an actual case. My point is that without the participation of the op-
ponent, society should not have confidence in the death penalties that
juries return.
6. Jury Decision Making.-Aside from the makeup of sen-
tencing juries in death penalty cases, there are additional reasons to
worry about the death penalty decisions that result. One source of
worry is the peculiar legal rules that interfere with jury decision-
making. For instance, the jury in Pennsylvania is instructed that if
one aggravating circumstance is found and no mitigating circum-
stance, or if the aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the mitigat-
ing circumstances, the verdict "must" be a sentence of death.'26 This
123. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
124. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
125. After Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), which both broadened the stan-
dard for exclusion of jurors from death-qualification and insulated state judge fact-finding on
the issue from federal habeas corpus review, it is not clear that a juror has to be an opponent
of the death penalty in order to be excluded.
126. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (Purdon 1987 & Supp. 1991).
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is the language upheld last year by the United States Supreme
Court in Blystone v. Pennsylvania.
127
For a death-qualified jury, this mandatory language makes no,
sense. There exists no circumstance other than general disquiet
about the death penalty that is a priori excluded from appropriate
sentencing consideration. If there is something about the defendant
or the crime that makes the jury hesitate to impose death, the jury
has presumably found something in the evidence to be mitigating.12
Because the mandatory language in the death penalty statute
has no valid role to play, there is a risk that it misleads the jury into
thinking they "must" impose the death penalty even if they feel that
the death penalty is not appropriate. Or, perhaps, the misleading
language confuses the jury in some other, unknown way. In any
event, the language should certainly be eliminated.
Judicial interference with sound jury decision-making arises
from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's insistence that the sentenc-
ing jury not be informed that the automatic alternative sanction to
the death penalty in Pennsylvania is life imprisonment without pa-
role. In Commonwealth v. Strong,129 the jury returned a question
during deliberations about the possibility that the defendant might
be paroled in the future. The trial judge sent back a response essen-
tially saying that the jury was not to think about parole, 130 which
presumably meant to the jury that the defendant could be paroled.
In view of the fact that all life sentences in Pennsylvania are without
possibility of parole, the defendant argued that the trial judge's re-
sponse was prejudicial. The supreme court held that the "required
response" is to tell the jury that "the future possibility of parole [is]
not to enter into their decision process."131 Substantially the same
situation in Strong took place in Commonwealth v. Edwards3 2 and
the supreme court ruled similarly.33
The court made its point about the irrelevance of parole even
127. 494 U.S. 299, 303-05 (1990).
128. After all, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Travaglia,
502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1226
(1984) that demeanor could be considered aggravating. Presumably, the demeanor of the de-
fendant could also justify a life sentence.
129. 522 Pa. 445, 563 A.2d 479 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1536 (1990).
130. Id. at 460, 563 A.2d at 485-86.
131. Id. at 460, 563 A.2d at 486.
132. 521 Pa. 134, 555 A.2d 818 (1989).
133. The trial judge in Edwards initially misstated the parole practice in his response,
but gave curative instructions along the lines approved later in Strong. See 521 Pa. at 156-59,
555 A.2d at 829-31; 522 Pa. at 458-60, 563 A.2d at 485-86.
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more clear in Commonwealth v. Henry,1 " in which it upheld the
denial of a requested defense instruction that a life sentence means
life without parole. 135 The court held not only that such an instruc-
tion would have been "misleading," but also that "parole, pardon
and commutation of sentence are matters that should not enter in
any manner into a jury's deliberations regarding the sentence to be
imposed in a first degree murder case."1 68
The attitude of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court about the pos-
sibility of parole amounts to putting the judicial head into the sand
and can only increase the risk of jury condemnation of persons who
do not deserve to be executed. Imagine that a sentencing jury is of
the view that the defendant would be a danger to the community if
released. Imagine further that the jurors do not know that, histori-
cally, commutation has been a rare occurrence and that they incor-
rectly assume that the defendant will be paroled within ten years. I
have interviewed jurors after sentencing hearings who believed that.
What if, despite the danger, the jury concludes that because of drug
use, or mental illness, or age, or whatever, the defendant is not too
evil to live but deserves a life sentence instead? Do the Justices re-
ally expect this jury to let the defendant go to prison, believing that
the defendant will eventually emerge to threaten more harm to inno-
cent people? There is at least a risk that the jury will sentence the
defendant to morally undeserved execution because the dead can
never be paroled.
The irony of this judicial interference with the jury decision
process is that the problem could be solved by the presentation of
accurate information to the jury. If only the courts allowed both
sides to present evidence of the likelihood of parole, the juries could
make their own decisions."' 7
Another interference with reliable jury sentencing decisions
comes from prosecution efforts to deflect the jury from its moral re-
sponsibility. I refer here not to extreme rhetoric by the prosecutor
that reflects in a crude way an argument that the defendant is too
evil to live. 18 Rather, I have in mind prosecution references to fac-
134. 524 Pa. 135, 569 A.2d 929 (1990).
135. Id. at 160, 569 A.2d at 941.
136. Id. (citation omitted).
137. I do not mean by this discussion to suggest that the current Pennsylvania rule is
constitutional. If the defense wishes to argue that the defendant is no threat because of life
without parole I think the preclusion of the underlying evidence violates the very lenient stan-
dard for mitigation admissibility stated in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). There is thus
a possibility that a number of Pennsylvania death sentences may be reversed on this ground.
138. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Strong, 522 Pa. 445, 455, 563 A.2d 479, 484 (1989),
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tors that are morally irrelevant, such as the reference in Common-
wealth v. Abu-Jamall s to the defendant's membership in the Black
Panther Party 4" or references to the availability of appeal following
conviction and sentence.14 1 Of course the mention of appeal invites
the jury to give the death penalty with the understanding that if they
have made a mistake, the courts will correct it. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has reversed one death sentence because of such a
prosecution argument,'4  affirmed two sentences despite such lan-
guage, 43 and promised to reverse per se all such cases in the fu-
ture.14 4 Despite this promise, the court recently upheld a capital con-
viction containing the appeal language in the guilt-phase close,
without any reference to its new "per se" rule.' 45 Thus, it is not clear
whether such appeals will lead to reversals in the future.
In Mills v. Maryland,'46 the United States Supreme Court
dealt directly with jury capital decision-making by requiring an indi-
vidual juror decision on the presence or absence of mitigation. 47 The
death penalty proponent views Mills ambivalently. It would not be
irrational to require unanimous jury findings for mitigation, just as
unanimity is required for the finding of facts supporting a verdict of
guilt in a criminal case. On the other hand, Mills does represent one
more attempt by the legal system to ensure that a defendant who
does not deserve to die will not be executed. The mitigating facts
rejected by some members of the jury as untrue may in fact be true,
and if true, may indicate that the defendant is not too evil to live.
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1536 (1990) ("Adolph Hitler had parents"); Commonwealth v. Duf-
fey, 519 Pa. 348, 370, 548 A.2d 1178, 1188 (1988) ("What about her as she pleaded for her
life?").
139. 521 Pa. 188, 555 A.2d 846 (1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 215 (1990).
140. Id. at 211, 555 A.2d at 859. The prosecution also argued that the victim was a year
younger than the defendant in order to rebut a claim that the age of the defendant was miti-
gating. Id. at 217, 555 A.2d at 860. What possible difference could the age of the victim
compared to that of the defendant make to the appropriateness of the death penalty?
141. See Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 209, 555 A.2d 846, 854 (1989),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 215; Commonwealth v. Beasley, 524 Pa. 341, 568 A.2d 1235, 1236
(1990).
142. Commonwealth v. Baker, 511 Pa. 1, 511 A.2d 777 (1986).
143. See Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 209, 555 A.2d 846, 854 (1989),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 215; Commonwealth v. Beasley, 524 Pa. 341, 568 A.2d 1235, 1236
(1990).
144. Commonwealth v. Beasley, 524 Pa. 34, 40 n.4, 568 A.2d 1235, 1238 n.4 (1990).
145. Commonwealth v. Green, 525 Pa. 424, 461, 581 A.2d 544, 562 (1990). Incredibly,
the court cited Abu-Jamal as authority for upholding the conviction without apparently re-
membering that the per se rule announced in Beasley was adopted in light of the Abu-Jamal
problem. See supra note 139. The death sentence in Green was vacated and remanded on other
grounds. 525 Pa. at 466, 581 A.2d at 564.
146. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
147. Id. at 374-75.
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Because individual juror consideration of mitigation is now
deemed to be mandated by the United States Constitution,'48 all
capital defendants have received its protection since 1988. In earlier
cases tried prior to Mills, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held
that the Pennsylvania jury instructions always complied with Mills;
that is, the court has claimed that the instructions always provided
for individual juror fact-finding on mitigation.' 9 Although it is true
that the Pennsylvania statute never stated a need for unanimity in
mitigation fact-finding, there are indications that some judges and
lawyers assumed that unanimity was required. For example, in the
few pre-1989 50 cases that utilized a verdict slip listing findings of
mitigating circumstances, the discussions in Pennsylvania Supreme
Court opinions suggest that there were unanimous findings. 151 Either
the Justices assumed that unanimity was required by the verdict
slips, or these findings were reached without thought. In two Penn-
sylvania capital cases decided prior to Mills, the trial judges in-
structed the sentencing jury that jury findings on mitigation must be
unanimous, and neither the prosecutors nor the defense attorneys ob-
jected, or even commented. 52 In another case, the record was am-
biguous but seems to suggest a requirement of unanimity as to
mitigation. 53
Today, the supreme court has no trouble finding error in any
requirement of unanimity. 5' But the court has failed to consider
how such errors could have come about. If judges and lawyers who
study and understand the death penalty statute could reach such an
erroneous conclusion, how may jurors prior to Mills made the same
mistake? If Mills is necessary to ensure the reliability of sentencing
decisions, the sentencing decisions made between 1978 and 1988
may not have the requisite reliability.
Aside from judicial decisions or statutory language that under-
148. See generally Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
149. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Frey, 520 Pa. 338, 554 A.2d 27 (1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1500 (1990).
150. In 1989, PA. R. CRIM. P. 358 became effective, requiring individualized listings of
mitigation.
151. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Henry, 524 Pa. 135, 155, 569 A.2d 929, 938 (1990),
cert. denied, 1II S. Ct. 1333 (1911) ("the jury also found two mitigating circumstances
152. Commonwealth v. Billa, 521 Pa. 168, 555 A.2d 835, 845 (1989); Commonwealth v.
Young, 524 Pa. 373, 572 A.2d 1217, 1228-29 (1990). In Young, the verdict slip expressly
required unanimous findings on mitigation. 524 Pa. at 396, 572 A.2d at 1228.
153. Commonwealth v. Jasper, 587 A.2d 705, 712 (Pa. 1991) (death sentence reversed
because "the jury could have been misled into believing that a unanimous verdict was required
in order to conclude a mitigating circumstance existed").
154. See cases cited in notes 152-53 supra.
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mine appropriate jury sentencing decisions, jury decisions in Penn-
sylvania have not been very sound. There are cases, for example, in
which juries have rejected obviously true statutory mitigating cir-
cumstances.1 5 Of course, these juries may have been rejecting the
weight rather than the presence of mitigation. But it is just as likely
that juries simply do not understand how the statute is supposed to
work. Errors of this sort are especially troubling because the death
penalty is mandatory under certain circumstances.15 6 The actual de-
cision to impose the death penalty may thus rest on questionable
fact-finding.
Though a sentencing jury may seem to be a competent forum
for deciding whether a defendant should be executed, it must be
remembered that the jury is not asked whether death is the appropri-
ate punishment for the particular defendant. No doubt that is the
ultimate decision the statute is meant to structure, but it is not the
simple question asked. Instead, the jury is asked to find facts and to
balance them to see whether aggravation "outweigh[s]" mitiga-
tion.1 5 7 One should not expect a clear and reliable answer when one
asks a murky question.
7. The Attitude of the Trial Judge.--One of the ways that
jury decision-making can be affected subtly is by a biased trial
judge. There is no reason to think, generally, that Pennsylvania trial
judges are biased against capital defendants. There will, of course,
be occasional instances that raise at least the appearance of bias. 58
Nevertheless, such instances do not detract from the reliability of
death penalty sentences as a general matter.
Two systemic practices in Pennsylvania do raise such concerns,
however. In one, the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas
155. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353 (Pa. 1991), in which the
prosecution and the defense stipulated that the defendant had no prior record and yet the jury
failed to find any mitigating circumstances. The jury even rejected 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
9711 (e)(1), which states, "The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convic-
tions." The rejection of any mitigation in the cases of James Smith, Kevin Hughes and Gary
Heidnik, see supra notes 32-35, 50-54 and accompanying text is certainly presumptively
wrong. Because of the lack of verdict slips in most cases, jury mitigation fact-finding is usually
hidden.
156. For example, the death penalty is mandatory when no mitigating circumstances are
found. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (Purdon 1987 & Supp. 1991); see supra notes 16-
28 and accompanying text.
157. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv).
158. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 523 Pa. 384, 567 A.2d 1023 (1987), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 225 (1990) (death penalty affirmed despite service of the trial judge as
prosecutor in defendant's prior first degree murder case, for which the plea later became a
matter of dispute at the sentencing hearing).
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appears to run what amount to death penalty courts.159 Death pen-
alty cases are not assigned to criminal court judges randomly. In-
stead, essentially all death penalty cases are assigned to a handful of
judges who preside over very large portions of all Pennsylvania death
penalty trials.1 60 As a consequence, one trial judge in Philadelphia
has presided at twenty-five of the sixty-five trials from Philadelphia
that resulted in death sentences. 6 '
The practice of specialized death penalty courts appears all the
more sinister because it seems to be an informal practice, without
formal sanction in local rule, and apparently, without public ac-
knowledgement. There is even some question about the validity of
such a practice. Pennsylvania Constitution Article I § 15 states: "No
commission shall issue creating special temporary criminal tribunals
to try particular individuals or particular classes of cases."
Channeling death penalty cases to a small number of trial
judges could create the advantage of a greater degree of expertise in
death penalty cases. The problem is that such specialized courts
could easily become conveyor belts for death sentences. The psycho-
logical acceptance of the death penalty for a particular defendant by
the judge could be communicated to a sentencing jury in pervasive
ways not easily subject to appellate review. The discontinuance of
specialized death penalty courts and a more random assignment of
death penalty cases would increase confidence in death sentences
from Philadelphia County.
The other systemic problem in Pennsylvania capital trials is the
decision by Attorney General Ernest Preate to mail to every trial
judge in Pennsylvania a copy of his office's manual, Prosecution of a
Death Penalty Case in Pennsylvania.162 Apparently, the Attorney
General's Office received letters from several trial judges indicating
that they read this prosecution manual and utilized it during capital
159. The following account and statistics have been furnished by the Pennsylvania
Council Monitoring Project, which is jointly sponsored by the Pennsylvania Prison Society and
the Pennsylvania Council to Abolish the Penalty of Death, available at the Pennsylvania Moni-
toring Project's Pittsburgh office.
160. It appears from any listing of the Philadelphia Criminal Trial Division that there is
a separate Homicide Trial Division. See, e.g., 204 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 20 (April 3,
1991). But the death penalty case breakdown by judge does not correspond to the total num-
ber of judges in the Homicide Division. A system of channeling death penalty cases to certain
judges takes place in Philadelphia.
161. REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA COUNCIL MONITORING PROJECT (Jan. 1991)
(copy on file at the Dickinson Law Review office).
162. This practice by the Attorney General came to light in a pre-trial hearing in a
capital case in Allegheny County in the fall of 1990 in which the author served as co-counsel:
Commonwealth v. Yarbough. The defendant ultimately was sentenced to life after the sentenc-
ing jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict.
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trials. 1' 8 While no doubt this manual contains many valuable in-
sights, it is, after all, a document designed to aid one side in the
capital case. It is not a scholarly, neutral, reference book. Trial
judges should not read such a book, except as part of a Common-
wealth brief on some issue." 4
It is unlikely that trial judges' reliance upon a prosecution
sourcebook has changed many outcomes in Pennsylvania capital
cases, however improper such reliance may be. But the fact that the
Attorney General would think it proper to mail such a partisan doc-
ument to the judiciary and the fact that the judges generally have
not objected to this practice causes one to wonder just how indepen-
dent the judiciary is from the prosecution. At the very least, this
practice may reveal other problems with the inclination of trial
judges in Pennsylvania death penalty cases.
8. Review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.-In death
penalty cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is responsible for
correcting legal errors,1 65 reversing any death sentence that is "the
product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor,"1 66 re-
versing any death sentence when the evidence fails to support the
finding of an aggravating circumstance,1 67 and reversing a death sen-
tence that "is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the crime and
the character and record of the defendant."' 8 But in actual practice
the court has been reluctant to reverse death sentences' 0" and some
of the statutory protections for defendants have not meant very
much. 1 °7 The court has so deferred to the sentencing jury as to raise
questions both of law and justice.
One example of the court's deference to the sentencing jury is
163. Copies of the letters introduced at the hearing in Blystone are on file in the Dickin-
son Law Review office.
164. The trial judge in Commonwealth v. Yarbough stated on the record at the pretrial
hearing, that once he saw what the manual was, he thought it inappropriate to read it and did
not do so.
165. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(h)(2).
166. Id. § 9711(h)(3)(i).
167. Id. § 9711(h)(3)(ii).
168. Id. § 9711(h)(3)(iii).
169. From March 1988 to June 1990, the court affirmed sentences of death in 31 direct
appeals, reversed convictions in four death penalty appeals, reversed sentences of death in
eight appeals and denied relief in two capital post-conviction proceedings.
170. From March 1988 to June 1990, the court did not reverse a sentence as either a
product of an arbitrary factor under § 9711(h)(3)(i) or as disproportionate under §
971 1(h)(3)(iii).
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the refusal to consider legal errors in sentencing when the jury171 has
found no mitigation in the case, but has found one or more aggravat-
ing circumstances. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Crawley,17 2 the court
reversed three of five aggravating circumstances found by the jury,
but refused to reverse the death sentence because no mitigation had
been found and the death sentence would still have been mandatory
under the statute.17  The court has even used this approach in cases
in which the record contains substantial mitigation, but the jury
found no mitigating circumstances present.
74
The court's approach assumes that the jury as a whole, and
each juror in particular, approaches the task of sentencing in dis-
crete steps, so that findings of aggravation and mitigation are not
related. But this may not be the case at all. Once the jury finds five
aggravating circumstances, as in Crawley, they may believe that any
finding of mitigation will be outweighed, so the finding of mitigation
can be cursory rather than searching. Certainly this will be the case
if one assumes, as the supreme court does, 17 5 that mitigation has al-
ways been each individual juror's decision. Why should an individual
juror who already has decided that aggravation outweighs mitigation
bother to assert that a mitigating circumstance is present, in disa-
greement with every other juror? After all, to the jurors the result is
the same whether death results from aggravation and no mitigation
or from weighing one against the other. If the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court is going to attach such enormous weight to the absence of
mitigation, the jury should at least be told that the process is
designed to do more than simply guide their decision.
Another example of the court's deference to the jury is the re-
fusal to reverse a death sentence when the jury ignores obvious and
even uncontested facts. As noted above, the most dramatic example
171. The death penalty statute provides for sentencing by the trial judge as an alterna-
tive to a sentencing jury. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(b) (Purdon 1987 & Supp. 1991).
172. 514 Pa. 539, 526 A.2d 334 (1987).
173. Id. at 565, 526 A.2d at 347. The same approach led to affirmances of the death
sentences in Commonwealth v. Buehl, 510 Pa. 363, 508 A.2d 1167 (1986), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 871 (1988); Commonwealth v. Christy, 511 Pa. 490, 515 A.2d 832 (1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1059 (1987). In Commonwealth v. Beasley, 504 Pa. 485, 475 A.2d 730 (1984), the
court refused to review a challenge to the finding of a second aggravating circumstance be-
cause one aggravating circumstance had been validly found and no mitigating circumstance
was found. Id. at 500, 475 A.2d at 738.
174. See discussion of Commonwealth v. Logan, 599 Pa. 607, 549 A.2d 531 (1988);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15, 540 A.2d 246 (1988) supra notes 29-34, 36-38 and
accompanying text. In Logan, the court reversed a finding of torture, 549 A.2d at 545-46 and
in Smith it reversed a finding of a significant history of violent felony convictions, 540 A.2d at
260.
175. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
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of obviously erroneous fact-finding occurred in Commonwealth v.
Copenhefer,17 1 in which the Commonwealth and defense stipulated
that the defendant had no criminal record and yet the jury found no
mitigating circumstance. 17 7 The jury thus ignored the mitigating cir-
cumstance enumerated in Section 9711(e)(1) of the death penalty
statute: "The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal
convictions." The jury would be free to impose a sentence of death
despite the presence of (e)(1), but refusing to find mitigation when it
is plainly present is simple error. Nevertheless, the court in
Copenhefer affirmed the sentence of death.178 The court has refused
to review findings of the jury that deny the presence of a mitigating
circumstance in other cases. 179 The court adopts a similar rule of
deference in terms of weighing aggravation against mitigation; the
decision to impose death is said to be a matter of jury discretion.' 80
To a point, the court's deference to jury fact-finding simply rep-
resents the usual division of labor between appellate courts and lower
courts. But clearly erroneous fact-finding, such as that in
Copenhefer, does not deserve such deference. And even in matters
usually of judgment, there comes a point at which judgment be-
comes unreasonable. It is true that one sentencer may consider the
age of twenty-one to be a mitigating circumstance and another sen-
tencer may find that twenty years of age is not mitigating.18 1 But
when the jury refuses to find mitigation 82 when the defendant is 18
years old 83 or 16 years old,184 one must consider whether the jurors
understand the job of fact-finding. One may ask the same question
with regard to the ultimate sentencing decision. Mitigation may
seem plainly to outweigh aggravation so as to cry out for judicial
intervention.'8 5 Yet the court will do nothing.
176. 587 A.2d 1353 (Pa. 1991).
177. Id. at 1358-60.
178. Id. at 1361.
179. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 524 Pa. 282, 571 A.2d 1035, 1044 (1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 224 (1990); Commonwealth v. Moser, 519 Pa. 441, 549 A.2d 76, 80
(1988) (panel of judges); Commonwealth v. Rolan, 520 Pa. 1, 549 A.2d 553, 560 (1988).
180. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 512 Pa. 298, 317, 516 A.2d 689, 698 (1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987): "Under our legislative scheme, it is exclusively a jury question
whether any mitigating factor is to be given determinative weight when balanced with other
mitigating and aggravating circumstances." See also Commonwealth v. Banks, 513 Pa. 318,
521 A.2d 1 (1987).
181. Cf. Commonwealth v. Pirela, 510 Pa. 43, 507 A.2d 23 (1986) (21) with Common-
wealth v. Henry, 524 Pa. 135, 569 A.2d 929 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1338 (1991) (20).
182. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(4) (Purdon 1987 & Supp. 1991) provides as a
mitigating circumstance: "The age of the defendant at the time of the crime."
183. Commonwealth v. Williams, 524 Pa. 218, 570 A.2d 75, 82 (1990).
184. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 555 A.2d 1264, 1274 (1989).
185. See generally cases cited supra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
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The statute gives the court great latitude to intervene in cases
such as these. The court may reverse a sentence that it finds to be
the result of "any . . . arbitrary factor."' 1 6 What could be more ar-
bitrary than clearly erroneous fact-finding? And when the jury
sentences a mentally ill man like Ronald Logan to death, and fails
even to find that he is mentally ill, is it not likely that the jurors were
afraid of his threats to kill them and everyone else?187 Such fear is
understandable, but it is not a proper ground to sentence someone to
death. Logan is not too evil to live. He is, even if competent, seri-
ously ill. He should be in prison, but not executed. The jury's fear
was an arbitrary factor and the court could and should have reversed
the sentence.
The court also refuses to review jury decision-making in terms
of the proportionality of the sentence. The death penalty statute re-
quires the court to perform comparative proportionality review. 188 In
response to this command, the court in Commonwealth v. Frey'
ordered the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts to gather
information on all cases that could have been prosecuted under the
statute. 190 Despite this promising beginning, the court has not ex-
plained how its comparative proportionality review is conducted, or
what "similar cases" it has considered or what makes the case at
hand proportionate.' 9' In most cases, the court's reference to com-
parative proportionality review has been cursory even when the jury
has found substantial mitigation in the case. 92 In cases in which the
186. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)(i).
187. See Commonwealth v. Logan, 519 Pa. 607, 647, 549 A.2d 531, 551 (1989).
188. Section 9711(h)(3)(iii) provides that the court shall not affirm a sentence of death
that is "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both
the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the defendant."
189. 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 (1989), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984).
190. Id. at 443, 475 A.2d at 707-08.
191. As the discussion below suggests, sometimes the court does identify similar cases by
identical findings of aggravation and mitigation. See infra notes 166-76 and accompanying
text.
192. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Henry, 524 Pa. 135, 569 A.2d 929 (1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1338 (1991) in which the jury found three aggravating circumstances and two
mitigating circumstances. The court's entire discussion of comparative proportionality con-
sisted of the following:
Finally, in accordance with our duty to review sentences of death from the
standpoint of their proportionality to sentences imposed in similar cases, Com-
monwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. at 62, 454 A.2d at 961, we have reviewed
the sentence imposed upon appellant in light of sentencing data compiled and
monitored by the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts. See Com-
monwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 443, 475 A.2d 700, 707-08 (1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 360, 83 L.Ed.2d 296 (1984). We perceive no
excess or disproportionality in the sentence imposed. Accordingly, the sentence
must be affirmed.
Id. at 161-62, 569 A.2d at 942. See also Commonwealth v. Moser, 519 Pa. 441, 549 A.2d 76
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jury finds no mitigating circumstances despite the presence of miti-
gating evidence, the court's proportionality review is further handi-
capped by the occasional suggestion that the mandatory penalty pre-
scribed by the statute renders the sentence of death proportionate
per se.198 Overall, the performance of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in regard to proportionality review has rightly been described
as a "mechanical, almost ritualistic approach . . . 19"
Even in cases in which the court does say something about pro-
portionality review, the statements merely demonstrate the superfici-
ality of the court's understanding of its task. For example, in uphold-
ing the proportionality of the death sentence in Commonwealth v.
Rolan,196 the court noted that in cases in which no mitigating cir-
cumstance was present and in which the aggravating circumstance of
a violent felony record was found, the jury returned a sentence of
death four out of six times."" This finding omits any consideration of
the facts at hand, which might have shown whether Rolan was simi-
lar either to the four death sentences or to the two life sentences.
The court's statement also neglects the obvious problem of the stat-
(1988), in which a sentencing panel of judges found two aggravating circumstances and two
mitigating circumstances and the court's discussion of proportionality review consisted of the
following:
Finally, the Appellant argues that the sentence in this matter is dispropor-
tionate to the sentences imposed in similar cases. As required by the Sentencing
Code, and Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 474 A.2d 700 (1984), we have
reviewed the records compiled by the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania
Courts and must conclude that the imposition of the death penalty in this case is
neither excessive nor disproportionate.
Id. at 450, 549 A.2d at 80.
193. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 461 n.14, 555 A.2d 1264, 1283
n.14 (1989):
As is the practice of this Court, we have examined the sentence of death in
order to determine if it is disproportionate or excessive to the penalty imposed in
similar cases. See Commonwealth v. Blystone, 519 Pa. 450, 549 A.2d 81 (1988).
Having considered the circumstances of the crime and the character of the Ap-
pellant, we conclude the sentence is not excessive or disproportionate. The jury
determined there were no mitigating circumstances but found one aggravating
circumstance, namely, killing while in the perpetration of a felony. N.T. 3-23
and 3-24-81 at 2118. The statute requires a verdict of death in such circum-
stances. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (Purdon 1982). The study
maintained by the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts indicates
the sentence is neither disproportionate nor excessive in comparison with similar
cases.
In the cases of James Smith and Ronald Logan, the proportionality review sections were ex-
tremely short. The court simply accepted the jury findings of no mitigation at face value, See
Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15, 47, 540 A.2d 246, 262 (1988); Commonwealth v. Logan,
519 Pa. 607, 636, 549 A.2d 531, 546 (1988).
194. Hartman, Critiquing Pennsylvania Comparative Proportionality Review in Capital
Cases, 52 PrT. L. REv. 871 (1991).
195. 520 Pa. 1, 549 A.2d 553 (1988).
196. Id. at 16 n.7, 549 A.2d at 560 n.7.
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ute's mandatory language. Two juries nullified the statute, in effect.
Why should the court be surprised that four juries had obeyed the
mandatory law? Perhaps those juries wanted to decide otherwise. In
addition, the court neglected to ask how often the death penalty is
even sought. Surely many prosecutors plea bargain or simply do not
seek death in cases in which the only aggravation is that the defend-
ant has a record of two felony convictions. The issue of prosecutional
discretion is even more pronounced in cases in which the only aggra-
vating circumstance is a killing during a felony. 197 A careful study of
all murders in Pennsylvania might demonstrate that death sentences
are rarely sought in such cases.
The unwillingness or inability of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to evaluate the case before it is the fundamental reason that
the court's proportionality review seems so rigid and pointless. In
Commonwealth v. Watson'98 the court confronted a mentally unbal-
anced man with no significant record who had killed his girl friend
after he and she had stopped living together. The jury found one
aggravating circumstance-knowingly endangering others-and two
mitigating circumstances-no prior record and extreme mental or
emotional disturbance.'99 Because there had never been a case with
this set of findings, the court apparently believed there were no simi-
lar cases. The court affirmed because in other cases, defendants with
one aggravating and two mitigating circumstances had been sen-
tenced to death. 0 Obviously, justice was not served in Watson.
A less dramatic example of the court's indifference to a case
before it occurred is Commonwealth v. Haag,20' in which the court
did recognize death penalty cases containing similar findings 202 and
affirmed because "[t]he death penalty has been imposed in a sub-
stantial portion of such cases."20 8 One needs to know, however,
whether Haag is more like the cases that led to life or more like the
cases that led to death. But that difficult evaluation is not carried out
by the court.
The proponent of the death penalty might maintain that com-
parative proportionality review is not important because it partakes
197. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hughes, 52 Pa. 423, 555 A.2d 1264 (1989); Common-
wealth v. Porter, 524 Pa. 162, 569 A.2d 942, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 307 (1990).
198. 523 Pa. 51, 565 A.2d 132 (1989).
199. Id. at 66-67, 565 A.2d at 140-41.
200. Id. at 70 n.7, 565 A.2d at 141 n.7.
201. 522 Pa. 388, 562 A.2d 289 (1989).
202. Aggravating circumstance (d)(2) and mitigating circumstance (e)(8).
203. Haag. 522 Pa. at 409, 562 A.2d at 299.
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of the goal of equality rather than of justice. 0 4 As long as the partic-
ular defendant deserves to be executed, it is argued, what difference
does it make whether other, similar defendants receive life
sentences?
This position is weak because when other criminals in the de-
fendant's situation do not receive a sentence of death, the prosecutor,
judge, or jury is deciding either that the defendant does not deserve
to be executed, or that even if he deserves execution, it is not worth
seeking it. Such judgments may be correct or incorrect, but that
kind of thinking suggests that a similarly situated defendant also
may not deserve the death penalty. Thus, comparative proportional-
ity review is, to an extent, an opportunity for the court to prevent
unjust executions. Unfortunately, the court has not yet regarded its
responsibilities in this light. The court has not attempted to satisfy
itself that justice has been done in the capital case before it.
9. Review by the Governor.-The Pennsylvania death penalty
statute contains what is, at first glance, a strange provision. Upon
affirmance of a sentence of death, "a full and complete record of the
trial, sentencing hearing, imposition of sentence and review by the
Supreme Court" is to be sent to the Governor. 0 5 What is the point
of sending the record? Presumably, the Governor or a representative
will read the record. And what is the point of that? One obvious
possibility is that the Governor should decide whether the defendant
deserves to be executed before he signs a warrant of execution. A
plurality of the court seems to take this view. They have described
the Governor's authority under Section 9711(i) as that of
"commutation." 20 6
What is odd about this gubernatorial authority is that the Gov-
ernor lacks state constitutional authority to grant commutations in
every other context. The Pennsylvania State Constitution requires
the governor to have the agreement of the Board of Pardons before a
commutation is effected.10 7 Nevertheless, the Governor may now
grant what is effectively a commutation of sentence in a death pen-
alty case if he reads something in the record that causes him to re-
fuse to sign a warrant of execution.
The protection offered to defendants through review by the Gov-
204. This is the position that Dr. van den Haag takes with regard to the problem of race
discrimination in death penalty sentencing. See DEBATE, supra note 3, at 206-07.
205. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(i) (Purdon 1987 & Supp. 1991).
206. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15, 540 A.2d 246 (1988).
207. PA. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
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ernor, like protection given through statutory review by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, has proved empty. Thus far, the Governors of
Pennsylvania have basically signed warrants in the order the records
were received. Though the records may be read, there is no opportu-
nity for the defendant to be heard, to address the record, to have a
hearing or even communication of any kind. This renders the Gover-
nor's review yet one more sham, another ineffective protection
against unjust results. At some point, the proponent of the death
penalty must worry whether errors in death penalty cases are likely
and if so, whether they are preventable. If errors persist, injustices
will be committed.
IV. An Afterword on Justice and the Death Penalty
There are injustices in the Pennsylvania death penalty system. I
have outlined some of them above. But because I believe that the
death penalty is a great evil, I cannot rest with such a demonstra-
tion. The death penalty would not be just whether each person on
death row had intentionally tortured a little girl to death, had been
represented by leading attorneys, or had been given every legal ad-
vantage, without regard to race, gender, income, geographic location,
status and all the other irrelevancies that stain our legal system. The
injustice would remain.
The proponent of the death penalty says that justice is giving
each person what he deserves. And the proponent maintains, as a
starting point, that people deserve to have done to them what they
have done to others.
This proposition has much to recommend it. There is such a
thing as deserving punishment. And it is just to render punishment
that is deserved.
But no one, not even the murderer, deserves to have done to him
what the murderer has done to the victim. Nor do we intend to do to
the murderer what the murderer did to the victim. Victims are killed
for no reason, or out of hatred or indifference, or for fun. Society
does not do that. Society maintains that it executes for the reason of
justice. This lends the dignity to the murderer (and his death) that
he denied to his victim. The claim of justice for the death penalty
cannot reside in doing "the same thing" to the murderer that he did
to his victim.
The claim of justice for the death penalty is closer to saying
that the murderer should not enjoy life because his victim cannot. It
is not fair that the murderer live when his victim cannot.
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This is true. But it does not mean society should kill the mur-
derer. It means that the murderer should not have killed his victim
in the first place. By executing the murderer, we have not lessened
by the weight of a grain of sand or the lightest feather the wrong
done to the victim. Killing the murderer actually partakes of frustra-
tion at not being able to exchange the life of the murderer for that of
the victim. That would be justice. If we could bring back the victim
by killing the murderer, we would have a claim of justice.
What punishment does the murderer deserve? I do not know
precisely what punishment fits the crime of murder. But whatever
the punishment, the murderer deserves it as a member of the human
family. The murderer is one of us. What is evil about the death pen-
alty is that through it, society claims that the murderer does not
deserve to be one of us--does not deserve to be a human being.
This is why the death penalty is not punishment. What we know
about punishment, we learn from our families. Punishment always
hopes for change, for teaching. The death penalty is not punishment
because it is extinction-the end of all relationship.
I do not know who deserves to be a human being. Proponents of
the death penalty say with confidence that they know. How confident
they must be, since a human life is continued or ended by the dis-
tinctions they feel they can make. The drunk driver who causes
death without intention does not deserve to be executed. The robber
who causes death without intention does.
Well, proponents say, you can quibble about the edges. But the
murderer, the one who intends to kill, sometimes with unspeakable
brutality, has forfeited his membership in the human family.
But no two murders are alike. No two murderers are alike.
There are those who plan to kill. and those who panic. There are
those who kill without caring whether or not they kill. There are
those who have been given every advantage and those who have been
abandoned. There are those who have been raised in love and those
who have been abused all their lives. Do they all deserve not to be
human beings any longer? American law says that they may or may
not. Most proponents agree. But I wonder if the proponent can really
make such an admission.
To admit that I have to know the circumstances of the crime
and the character and history of the defendant before I know
whether he deserves to be a human being is to admit that I can never
condemn another man to death. I will never know enough. I can
never know exactly what happened. I can never know the meaning of
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what happened. I can never know the heart of another man. At least
I cannot know enough to condemn him to death.
The proponent does no better by saying that all murderers de-
serve to be killed. There is no possible, simple rule. There is no per-
fect distinction between negligence and malice, between premedita-
tion and an unplanned act. There is not even an ultimate justification
for someone who kills by society's order. Unless all who cause death
are to be put to death, the proponent must make the distinctions
between life and death. He, fallible and unwise as are we all, is cer-
tain to be wrong.
But are there not some people who have shown they do not de-
serve to live, even though most of the time we cannot say with cer-
tainty whether this is so? What of the child torturer? Do not the
child's screams before death mercifully comes tell us all we need to
know about that man?
We are helpless to redeem those cries. We can imprison him,
kill him, torture him. We cannot banish those cries. And because
those cries haunt us, we want to kill.
If only this were true. If only the death penalty in America par-
ticipated in such cosmic drama. If only we were driven to the un-
speakable act of killing by the horror we feel at what the condemned
man has done. This at least would be worthy of the blood we spill.
This would bind us to the condemned man.
The death penalty has nothing to do with this. It is not horror
we feel. Not in a country that watches a movie about Ted Bundy,
and buys books about Gary Gilmore. It is not justice; it is a diversion
for politicians and a spectacle for the public.
And sometimes it is not even titillation, but repetitious boredom
we feel. In the run of the mill murder, we care not at all for the
victim or for the murderer. It is not justice when the trial is given a
number and the participants are bureaucrats going through the
motions.
When our trials are a search for the truth in the human heart,
when there is agony about the victim's pain and the murderer's life,
when we are just and wise and good, then we may think about kill-
ing. But when that day comes, we will choose to weep for the victims
rather than kill for them.
